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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2001, thirty Cuban men, women, and children
each reportedly secured payment in excess of $10,000 to smug-
glers in Florida for covert transit to the United States.1 They
1. See Jody A. Benjamin, Tanya Weinberg, & Vanessa Bauza, Search for 30
Cubans Called Off. U.S. Officials Begin Inquiry into Fatal Smuggling Attempt, SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 1A.
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crowded onto a hired stranger's speedboat on the north coast of
Cuba for the 100-mile crossing under the cover of darkness. When
the vessel failed to arrive in South Florida the following day, as
U.S.-based relatives expected that it would, the United States
Coast Guard was notified.2 The Coast Guard's search discovered a
capsized vessel believed to be that driven by the hired smuggler,
but no survivors or bodies were found.' This event is typical of
many unsuccessful human smuggling trips in the Straits of Flor-
ida, as smuggling has flourished in this corridor since 1998."
This comment will examine the historical background and
unique circumstances that have spawned this localized business
of human smuggling' and will discuss the issues countering effec-
tive resolution of the crisis. Part II discusses the historical back-
ground and distinctive nature of Cuban alien migration and the
factors that have generated the smuggling trend. Part III exam-
ines the roles of various agencies responsible for alien interdiction
and analyzes their ability to prevail given resource capabilities
and challenges in the existing law. Part IV analyzes the complexi-
ties of prosecuting captured smugglers and discusses competing
approaches to a unique problem. Part V discusses the limits of
current measures available under the law to prevent smuggling.
Part VI surveys the impact that recent terrorist events and
related legislation could have on reducing human smuggling.
This comment concludes that repeal of the Cuban Adjustment
Act would probably remove the unintended, U.S.-imposed incen-
tives for Cuban aliens to resort to smuggling, but it is unlikely
that this change will happen. Absent any policy shift, the threat
of smuggling and smuggling-related deaths demands that the
United States improve law enforcement resource capabilities and
information sharing, maximize preventative measures under the
law, and widen the scope of prosecutions to encompass the smug-
2. Press Release No. 11-09, U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District Public Affairs,
Coast Guard Locates Capsized Boat, Searches for Survivors (Nov. 19, 2001) (on file
with author).
3. Press Release No. 11-10, U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District Public Affairs,
Coast Guard Intends to Suspend Search for Missing Cuban Migrants, Sets up Meeting
with Family Members (Nov. 20, 2001) (on file with author).
4. See Interview with Curtis Miner, AUSA, Southern District of Florida, Major
Crimes Division, Miami, Fla. (Feb. 26, 2002).
5. Human smuggling is the for-profit transport of aliens illegally across borders
and is distinguished from human trafficking by which migrants are coerced and
transported for the purpose of exploitation through labor or prostitution. See
Friedrich Heckman & Tanja Wunderlich, Trans-Atlantic Workshop on Human
Smuggling, 15 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 167 (2000).
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gler's entire support structure. Through these steps, it is highly
probable that the flow of smuggled migrants can be seriously
diminished.
II. HISTORY, TRENDS, AND THE EMERGENCE OF
A NEW THREAT
A. Cuban Migration Background
Tension and confrontation have marked the U.S.-Cuba rela-
tionship since Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959 and severance
of diplomatic relations in 1960.6 As Cubans fled the island to the
United States, Congress was prompted to pass the Cuban Adjust-
ment Act in 1966, whereby any Cuban alien who was physically
present in the United States for at least one year could apply for
and be considered lawfully admitted for permanent residence.7
This preferential treatment remains in effect today.
Between 1966 and 1971, the United States coordinated "Free-
dom Flights" which transported several hundred thousand
Cubans to the United States.' From 1971 until September 1994,
Cuban President Castro periodically used immigration policy as a
political spigot by opening the Cuban border for unrestricted out-
flow in order to abate political and economic dissention within
Cuba and to burden the United States. Castro responded to politi-
cal defiance in 1980 by opening Cuba's border to nearly 125,000
people in what became known as the Mariel Boatlift? Suffering
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FACT SHEET, U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS (May 2001)
available at http:/www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/2558.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2002) [hereinafter U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS]. Castro assumed power in 1959 and was
initially recognized as the head of the new Cuban government. Id. The United States
broke relations with Cuba in October 1960 once Cuba expropriated U.S. properties
and declared commitment to a one party Marxist-Leninist system. Id.
7. See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, as amended (1966), available
at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/publiclaw_89-732.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2002). "Any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States... and has been physically
present in the United States for at least one year, may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion ... to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for
permanent residence." Id. While waiting for the year and one day to pass, Cubans
are normally released from detention as parolees. See id.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS FACT SHEET, CHRONOLOGY
OF CUBAN MIGRATION, 1958-1998 (Mar. 20, 2000) available at httpJ/www.state.gov/
www/regions/wha/cuba/migration-chron.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter
CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN MIGRATION].
9. See ALEx LARZELERE, THE 1980 CUBAN BOATLIFT 12-13 (1988). In April 1980,
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from island-wide food shortages and electrical blackouts in 1994,
Castro quelled demonstrating mobs by again allowing
unrestricted departure by sea."0 The U.S. response to this mass
migration was a coordinated at-sea rescue effort entitled Opera-
tion ABLE VIGIL." Unlike the rescued migrants from Mariel, the
30,000 migrants in 1994 were transported to Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, rather than directly to the United States.12
In 1994 and 1995, the United States and Cuba established
bilateral migration accords.13 These accords stipulate, inter-alia,
that Cuban migrants interdicted at sea will be returned to Cuba
and will receive instruction on legal means of immigration, and
oblige Cuba to refrain from any action against returned migrants
for attempting to immigrate illegally.' 4 Both parties agreed to
cooperate jointly to ensure "safe, legal, and orderly" migration and
that "all actions taken will be consistent with the parties' interna-
tional obligations." 5
Furthermore, the United States committed to provide no less
than 20,000 visas annually for legal immigration of Cubans to the
United States. 6 Despite this bilateral attempt to encourage
approximately 10,000 Cubans stormed the Peruvian Embassy in Havana to seek
political asylum. U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, supra note 6. The Cuban Government then
allowed Cubans to depart unopposed from Mariel, a port on the north coast of Cuba.
Id. Between April and September 1980, 124,776 Cuban migrants were rescued at sea
and brought to the United States. See U.S. COAST GUARD, OFFICE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, ALIEN MIGRANr INTERDICTION, MARIEL BOAT LiFT, available at http://
www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/mariel.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2002); see generally
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982) (dismissing
indictments charging defendants with transporting illegal aliens during the Mariel
Boatlift).
10. See U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, supra note 6.
11. See U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction: Operation ABLE VIGIL, at
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/amiostatsl.htm#fy (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
Over 30,000 Cubans were interdicted at sea in a one-month period between August
and September 1994. See id. A total of 37,191 Cubans were interdicted at sea during
calendar year 1994. See id.
12. See CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN MIGRATION, supra note 8. Eventually, these
30,000 Cubans were transported to the United States and the visas issued were
credited against the 20,000 minimum annual visa commitment in the amount of 5,000
per year. See Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on the Normalization of
Migration, Building on the Agreement of Sept. 9, 1994, May 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 327
[hereinafter The Accords].
13. See generally The Accords, supra note 12.
14. See The Accords, supra note 12, at 328. Representatives of the U.S. Interests
Section located in Havana are charged with monitoring this commitment. See id.
15. See id.
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. INTERESTS SEC., HAVANA, CONSULAR AND
REFUGEE OPERATIONS IN CUBA (May 21, 1997), available at http://usembassy.state.
gov/havana/wwwhop.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002). This commitment to a
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orderly and legal migration, many Cubans still resort to illegal
means of migration. 7 Some Cubans are motivated by political
reasons, others are in search of an improved economic lifestyle,
while others seek reunification with families that have already
migrated to the United States. 8
Given the political climate in Cuba, the United States recog-
nizes that each individual who is intercepted trying to enter the
United States illegally may have legitimate concerns or a credible
fear of persecution if returned to Cuba.'9 Therefore, despite the
U.S. agreement to repatriate all Cubans interdicted at sea per The
Accords, each Cuban is interviewed by an Asylum Pre-Screening
Officer ("APSO") to make a determination of whether the individ-
ual has a credible fear of persecution if returned."
The economic disparity between Cuba and the United States
ensures the likelihood that Cubans will continue to make perilous
journeys across the Straits of Florida to seek better lives. Most
Cubans interdicted at sea are considered economic refugees, with-
out credible fear claims, and are returned to Cuba under The
Accords." These migrants are often trying to escape the poverty
and dismal living conditions that persist in Cuba.2 2 Additionally,
the majority of Cubans who have successfully migrated to the
minimum number of annually authorized immigrants represents a policy
distinguished from U.S. immigration policy with all other countries. See generally id.
17. See U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions at Sea, Fiscal Year
1982-2002, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/amiostatsl.htm#cy (last visited
Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions at Sea]. After The
Accords were implemented, interdiction at sea rates still measured from 400 to 1600
Cuban migrants annually between 1995 and 2001. See id.
18. See generally Mark P. Sullivan & Maureen Taft-Morales, RL30806: Cuba:
Background and Current Issues for Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 17, 2001).
19. See generally State Department Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Michael
Ranneberger, Remarks before the Governor's Free Cuba Task Force (Apr. 30, 1997),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/970430_ranneberger.html (last
visited June 8, 2002) [hereinafter Ranneberger Remarks].
20. See id. Asylum Pre-Screening Officers ("APSOs") are transported to the at sea
location of detained migrants to make credible fear determinations. See id. Although
the text of the The Accords seems absolute that all Cubans interdicted at sea will be
returned, the language requiring actions "consistent with international obligations"
allows the United States to continue to screen migrants for a credible fear
determination. See generally The Accords, supra note 12. Any Cuban migrant with a
legitimate claim would then be excluded from those identified for return to Cuba. See
Ranneberger Remarks, supra note 19.
21. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, Chief, Operations Law Branch,
Seventh Coast Guard District Legal Office, in Miami, Fla. (Feb. 13, 2002). Coast
Guard Cutters routinely transport interdicted Cubans back to Cuba. See id.
22. See Sullivan & Taft-Morales, supra note 18.
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United States have settled in Florida.2' A Cuban who knows that
her relatives, friends, and a welcoming support community are liv-
ing in freedom only ninety miles away, has an enticing lure loom-
ing over the horizon.
B. Denying the Route: Smuggling Emerges as the
Only Viable Option
Cubans who are unwilling to wait for legal means by which to
immigrate have traditionally traveled to the United States,
directly or indirectly, aboard homemade rafts or tubes. Notwith-
standing the overwhelming surge of migrants during the mass
migrations in 1980 and 1994, U.S. Forces efficiently detect,
recover, and return most rafters to Cuba. 4 Given that rafting has
become nearly futile, traditional rafting has subsided as the pri-
mary means of migration since 1994. Hence, the rafting route
has been effectively denied. Moreover, since Cubans generally do
not have access to any means of conveyance other than homemade
rafts, their only alternative has been to rely on someone from the
United States to retrieve them.
On occasion, Cuban Americans living in the United States,
desperate to have their family members in Cuba come to the U.S.,
have traveled by boat to pick up their relatives. This method,
however, has proven to be very risky, especially if apprehended by
Cuban forces. 6 The frequency of these events has been managea-
ble for law enforcement. 7 Even if the individuals are prosecuted
so that the practice will be discouraged, the violators often evoke
jury sympathy because their motivation is to rescue loved ones,
23. See U.S. DEPARTMENT Of HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CULTURE, RACE, AND
ETHicrTy: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, 6-2 (citing to the POPULATION
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2000), available at http:/www.mentalhealth.org/cre/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2002). This study indicates that two-thirds of Cuban-Americans live in
Florida. See id.
24. While it is difficult to quantify what percentage of all voyages are interdicted
because the number of successful trips cannot be ascertained, resources that patrol in
search of migrant vessels have had fewer and fewer interdictions. See Coast Guard
Migrant Interdictions at Sea, supra note 17.
25. See Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions at Sea, supra note 17.
26. Cuban forces apprehended a Cuban-American smuggler when the smuggling
vessel capsized and one person was killed. See Anita Snow, Americans' Smuggling
Trial Begins, ASS'D PRESS, Aug. 27, 1999, available at http://198.62.75.1www2/fcf
smug82899.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). Several of the suspect's relatives were
aboard the vessel in addition to other migrants who allegedly paid up to $8000 each.
See id.
27. See John D. McKinnon, Prosecutors Stem Exodus, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 36.
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not to gain profit through smuggling.28 Some defendants have
been tried for transportation of Cuban aliens but the prosecutions
have not been successful.29
Cubans have realized that in order to immigrate to the
United States and become eligible for permanent residency status
under the Cuban Adjustment Act, they must evade interdiction at
sea and they must actually reach land. 0 Making it into the terri-
torial sea of the United States is insufficient for procedural rights
to attach.3 Absent a credible fear, migrants interdicted in the ter-
ritorial sea will be returned to Cuba per The Accords.2 Dry land,
therefore, serves as a goal line for Cuban migrants.' Given these
conditions, the only consistently successful transportation mode
capable of getting Cubans to dry land is professional smuggling.
Professional smugglers can provide vessels with the speed and
maneuverability to outperform law enforcement resources. Boat
captains have the expertise to navigate along both the Cuban and
Florida coasts and are compensated handsomely for their willing-
ness to take their chances against law enforcement on both sides
of the Straits of Florida. Finally, professional smugglers can pro-
vide the necessary logistical coordination of the covert transit
through an underground network collecting advance payment or
financing of expensive fees from relatives in both Cuba and the
United States.
28. See id.
29. See id.; see also United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (lth Cir.
1982) (dismissing indictments charging defendants with transporting illegal aliens
during the Mariel Boatlift).
30. See David Cazares, Tragedy at Sea Puts Spotlight on U.S. Policy: Preferential
Status for Defectors Actually Leads to People Smuggling, Law Critics Say, SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 42A.
31. See generally Department of Justice Memorandum from Office of General
Counsel to INS General Counsel Regarding Rights of Aliens Found In United States
Internal Waters (Nov. 21, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/pft90.htm (last
visited June 8, 2002). This memorandum details the legal determination known as
the Feet Wet/Feet Dry distinction. See id. Aliens of any nationality interdicted in the
territorial sea and internal waters of the United States are to be distinguished from
"Aliens Treated as Applicants for Admission" under the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996). See id. Only those aliens that have landed on U.S. soil are considered "present
in" or to have "arrived in" the United States for purposes of the Act and therefore
entitled to procedural rights and deportation hearings. See id. The feet wet/feet dry
policy is often inaccurately credited as the reason why Cubans who reach shore are
allowed to remain in the United States, whereas it is actually the Cuban Adjustment
Act that grants Cubans eligibility for permanent residency in a year and a day. See
generally Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 7.
32. The Accords, supra note 12.
33. See Cazares, supra note 30.
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Given the detached and lucrative nature of alien smuggling,
organizers are generally only concerned with maximizing profit by
getting as much of their human cargo from one point to another
without getting caught. 4 Safety subsequently takes a low priority
as evidenced by overcrowded and dangerous vessels. Smuggling is
presumed to be very successful, although assessing the actual
number of people who arrive in the United States by way of smug-
gling is difficult." It is likely that successful events are either not
reported out of fear of retaliation by the smuggling network or
because those smuggled have no incentive to report the event
since they are able to remain in the United States whether they
truthfully report how they arrived here or not. 6
C. The Unique Nature of Cuban Alien Smuggling
Cuban alien smuggling is unique from other forms of alien
smuggling, even within the Caribbean region. The Caribbean is a
transit zone for people of many nationalities, including Haitian,
Dominican Republic, Eastern European, Southeast Asian, and
Middle Eastern. 7 The migrants who are smuggled from Cuba to
the United States have generally been exclusively Cuban,
whereas those who migrate between Caribbean Islands and into
Puerto Rico are of various descents and use the islands as way-
points with the ultimate destination being the U.S. mainland. To
date, few nationalities use Cuba as a waypoint, despite its close
proximity to the United States. This is probably due to the per-
ception that the Cuban government has strict control over its bor-
ders. Given Cuba's close proximity to the United States, Cubans
do not face the challenges that other nationalities face in having to
make multiple trips via numerous countries to reach their final
destination. The transit over the horizon is enticing given the
short duration of risk and immediate reunion with a community of
family and friends at their destination.
The United States and Cuba agreed in The Accords to meet
periodically by mutual consent for discussions to improve effec-
34. See David Cazares, 7 Accused of Smuggling; U.S. Says Ring Transported 100
Cubans; 1 Died, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 1, 2001, at 3B.
35. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
36. See generally id. Many landed migrants reportedly delay reporting their
arrival to law enforcement until smuggling vessels are well beyond detection or
simply claim that they raifed from Cuba and their raft sank a short distance off shore.
Id.
37. See Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions at Sea, supra note 17.
38. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
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tiveness in ensuring orderly migration; these discussions are con-
ducted annually."9 Despite the advances made through bilateral
cooperation, the Government of Cuba blames the United States
for the emergence of smuggling because the Cuban Adjustment
Act and the Feet Wet/Feet Dry legal distinction act together to
encourage migration by smugglers.4" Cuba also asserts its dissat-
isfaction with U.S. enforcement against captured smugglers4' as
compared to Cuba's purported tough stance in accordance with
The Accords.42
The assertion that the Cuban Adjustment Act encourages
smuggling is difficult to dispute but is usually re-characterized by
U.S. officials to shift the attention to Cuba's political and economic
shortfalls. 43 Moreover, the United States shows no signs of repeal-
ing the Cuban Adjustment Act to remove the incentive to reach
the shoreline. In March 1996, Congress passed and the President
signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
("LIBERTAD") Act after U.S.-Cuba tensions spiked when Cuban
fighter jets shot down unarmed aircraft in international airspace,
killing three U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident.44 The Act codi-
fied the longstanding U.S. embargo on trade and financial trans-
actions.4' Additionally, each year since 1996, the President has
renewed a declaration of a National Emergency Related to Cuba
stating that ". . .the Government of Cuba has not demonstrated
that it will refrain from future use of reckless and excessive force
against U.S. vessels and aircraft that may engage in memorial
activities or peaceful protest north of Cuba."46 More recently,
there has been some momentum for easing U.S. policy toward
39. See The Accords, supra note 12.
40. See Dagoberto Rodriguez, Chief, Cuban Interests Section, Remarks to U.S.-
Cuba Cooperative Security Conference (Feb. 2001) (translated by Center for Defense
Information), available at httpJ/www.uscubasecurity.org/about.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2002).
41. See id.
42. See id. Rodriguez claims that over seventy smugglers have been detained in
Cuba, that Cuba actively seizes boats to be used for departure, and imposes stiff
prison penalties on those involved in smuggling activities. See id.
43. See Dalia Acosta, Politics-Cuba / US: Havana Again Challenges U.S. Migration
Policy, INT'L PRESS SEnv., Dec. 4, 2001. James Carragher, the U.S. State Department
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs characterized the motives of Cuban migrants as
derived from their inability to "exercise their human rights," and "the continued
failure of the Cuban economy." Id.
44. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (known as the
Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L. No. 104-114, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (1996).
45. See id.
46. Proclamation No. 6867, 63 Fed. Reg. 137 (July 17, 1998), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020227-8.html (last visited June 8,
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Cuba by lifting travel ban restrictions, yet there has not been dis-
cussion concerning any change to the Cuban Adjustment Act."
The remaining criticism over the measure of U.S. law enforcement
efforts to disrupt smuggling and prosecutorial efforts to convict
will be discussed in detail in Parts III and IV.
Solving the Cuba-U.S. smuggling problem transcends the
framework in solutions offered by the United Nations model set
forth in the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants By Land,
Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime." Solutions to smuggling
are generally rooted in actively improving the environment in the
source country.4 9 The approach offered in workshop discussions
may have valid application in other regional or other national
smuggling operations, but unfortunately the relationship between
the United States and Cuba inhibits application here. Cuban
migration is also distinguished from other regional smuggling
operations because information is solicited from every Cuban
migrant and consideration given to each migrant for a credible
fear determination; migrants of other nationalities must voice an
asylum claim to receive any consideration.
III. THE COMPLEXITIES OF ENFORCING THE LAW
A. Maritime Interdiction: U.S. Coast Guard
Authority, Resources, and Constraints
The primary agency in the challenging mission of maritime
alien detection and interdiction is the U.S. Coast Guard. This
mission has become increasingly difficult to prosecute since alien
smuggling organizations now dominate Cuban migration and
smugglers maintain an advantage over law enforcement agen-
cies." Coast Guard resources have had marginal success inter-
2002). The Proclamation has been renewed annually with the most recent on Feb. 27,
2002.
47. On Jul. 25, 2001, the House of Representatives voted 240-186 in favor of HR
2590 banning Treasury Department funding to enforce travel restrictions on Cuba.
The language was, however, subsequently omitted from the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act 2002, passed by the Senate Nov. 1, 2001.
48. See G.A. Res. A/RES/55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N, Doc. A/55/383 (2000).
The UN model calls for open communication and sharing of information to the fullest
extent in order to cripple smuggling networks. See id. In contrast to following this
model, U.S.-Cuba diplomatic dialogue has been limited to annual migration
discussions and operations under The Accords. See The Accords, supra note 12.
49. See generally Interagency Working Group Releases, Report on Alien
Smuggling, 73 No. 4 INTERPRETER RELEASES 99 (Jan. 1996).
50. See generally Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
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cepting the smuggling vessels, usually thirty feet in length with
two or more outboard engines. Detecting these vessels at night is
nearly impossible even though some airborne and surface assets
are equipped with state of the art night vision goggles, thermal
imaging devices, standard radar, and Forward Looking Infrared
Radar ("FLIR"). Unless search coordinators are given a last
known position, course and speed of a suspect vessel in order to
focus the search in a certain area, it is unlikely that assets will
stumble across a smuggling vessel while conducting regular
patrols. Despite the growing number of smuggling events, the
search area remains too large and the search target too small for
available law enforcement assets to saturate the transit zone.
Upon detection of a suspect vessel, the challenge shifts to forc-
ing the vessel to stop while keeping safety of life at sea tanta-
mount to all else. Although smuggling vessels are usually
severely overloaded, smugglers still operate, albeit without regard
for safety, at speeds faster than most Coast Guard vessels. One
author asserts that future success in the maritime realm may be
contingent upon building improved Coast Guard assets capable of
high speeds in rough, open ocean conditions for extended periods
of time." This view offers a sound long-term possibility for the
maritime anti-smuggling mission but no immediate relief, as
resource improvements require congressional budget approval,
design and construction. Coupling improved resource capability
with well-trained personnel must be pursued in order to attempt
to overcome the smuggler's dominance in the maritime realm.
Reckless smugglers, however, could easily respond with newer
and faster smuggling vessels, still unrestricted by concerns for
safety.
Moreover, forcing a fast boat full of people to stop, even with
numerous law enforcement vessels, is no easy task without put-
ting the lives of those onboard all vessels in danger. This situa-
tion inevitably results in a chase to the shoreline where only a
coordinated effort between forces at sea and forces on land can
prevent the vessel from reaching shore and unloading its cargo. 2
Detention of smugglers and aliens at sea requires dedication of a
Coast Guard Cutter to hold and provide humanitarian care. This
51. See Jim Howe, The Need for Big Speed, in UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE:
PROCEEDINGS 58 (Dec. 2001). Although this article specifically targets drug
interdiction, the Coast Guard uses the same resources for drug interdiction and
migrant interdiction.
52. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
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inevitably reduces resource availability, and the Cutter's crowded
decks substantially decrease maneuverability and effectiveness to
conduct any missions.
Cuba claims to be diligent in the pursuit of smugglers and
tough in its prosecutions." Cuba plays a vital role in the Coast
Guard's ability to intercept smuggling vessels.' Upon detection of
a smuggling event, the Cuban Border Guard regularly faxes
smuggler information to the U.S. Coast Guard Command Center
in Miami, Florida, especially when Cuban forces are unable to
respond.55 Cuban authorities, however, have criticized the United
States for failing to reciprocate with information on case outcome
and status of people who do not return. 6 The Coast Guard
responds to all the telexes that it has the resource capacity to han-
dle. 7 Nevertheless, some reports reportedly still go unchecked
due to resource constraints.5 In the interest of continued dialogue
and increased safety of life at sea, the Coast Guard or other appro-
priate U.S. authority should consider providing periodic, detailed
feedback to the Cuban Border Guard with regard to each notifica-
tion received, whether or not a response is launched or is
successful.
The Coast Guard role in stemming the flow of smuggled
Cuban aliens is critical. Unless stopped at sea, all the undocu-
mented Cuban aliens will remain in the United States once they
reach shore. Yet, successful end game in a migrant smuggling
event relies on coordinated responses with the U.S. Border Patrol.
B. Shore-side Investigation: U.S. Border Patrol
Anti-Smuggling
The United States Border Patrol ("USBP") is the mobile uni-
53. See Rodriguez, supra note 40.
54. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
55. See id. The demands of coordinated air traffic in the busy corridor between the
United States and South America require that there be open communication between
Cuba and the United States for flight safety and emergency situations. See id.
Likewise, the Search and Rescue mission of the U.S. Coast Guard requires that Coast
Guard authorities be able to communicate with officials in Cuba for safety of life at
sea. See id. By means of telexes, and also by fax, the Cuban Border Guard and the
Coast Guard Command Center in Miami relay real-time information to one another.
See id.
56. See Rodriguez, supra note 40.
57. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
58. Mark Fineman, Inside Look at Human Smuggling; More Cuban Americans
Face Tougher Jail Terms in Havana, but Castro's Border Guard Unit Confesses to
Being Overmatched, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at Al.
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formed law enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ("INS"); Border Patrol is the primary agency
concerned with detection and apprehension of illegal aliens and
smugglers of aliens at or near the land border.59 This is accom-
plished by maintaining surveillance, following up leads, respond-
ing to electronic sensor alarms and aircraft sightings, and
interpreting and following tracks." Additionally, Border Patrol is
the lead agency on anti-smuggling investigations.6
Manpower allocations are based on the agents' duties ashore;
hence, Border Patrol often lacks the manpower to dispatch agents
to sea where investigations must be completed.2 Cuban aliens
cannot be conveniently brought to shore for the duration of an
investigation because they would then be ineligible for return to
Cuba. " Compounding Border Patrol's manpower deficiencies is
agency-wide weakness in anti-smuggling program coordination,
lack of an automated case tracking and management system, and
ineffective procedures for collection and reporting of intelligence.6
Given this environment, exhaustive investigation and prose-
cution of alien smuggling events is feasible in only the most seri-
ous cases, such as those involving injury or loss of life.65
Alternatively, alien smugglers interdicted at sea who do not have
a documented history will often be released without more than
administrative documentation of the event.6 This reinforces per-
ceptions that the United States does not adequately punish or
deter alien smuggling.
Border Patrol also coordinates the shore-side response for
aliens who make it to shore. If the communications network
works well, then Border Patrol would ideally intercept a suspect
vessel evading capture at sea upon arrival. This inherently
requires coordination of both State and Federal resources to sum-
59. See U.S. Border Patrol, Overview, Mission, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/
graphics/lawenfor/bpatrol/overview.htm (last visited June 8, 2002).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4. The U.S. Border Patrol
Anti-Smuggling unit for Cuban migrant interdictions normally has only 6 qualified
investigators to conduct all its maritime and land-based investigations. See id.
63. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 7.
64. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INSPECTIONS DIsON, SURVEY OF INS's
ANTI-SMUGGLING UNITS, Report No. 1-2001-003 (March 2001). The OIG surveyed field
units and validated the GAO's reported findings of deficiencies in GAO/GGD-00-103,
ALIEN SMUGGLING: MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS A GROWING PROBLEM (May 2000). Id.
65. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
66. See id.
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mon the necessary manpower and expertise to cover hundreds of
miles of shoreline.
Inter-agency cooperation between the Coast Guard and Bor-
der Patrol, as well as other maritime and shore-side resources
such as Customs, Florida Marine Patrol, and State and Local
police authorities, is essential for apprehension of smugglers.
Beyond this coordinated effort, case development is dependent
upon the willingness to prosecute by the office of the U.S.
Attorney.67
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF PROSECUTING
SUSPECTED SMUGGLERS
A. Statutory Violations and Charging Strategy
Smuggling of Cuban migrants poses prosecution challenges
unique from other forms of migrant smuggling. Cuban migrant
smuggling is localized to South Florida and therefore exclusively
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida prosecutes
the cases.6" Since Cubans are the only nationality of migrants
that receive preferential treatment once they reach shore, investi-
gations and prosecution decisions concerning witnesses and evi-
dence must be made while all evidence and witnesses remain at
sea. Federal prosecutors combine several applicable smuggling
charges under 8 U.S.C. 1324 for Transportation of Illegal Aliens
combined with charges under Title 18, U.S. Code §371, Conspiring
to Smuggle Illegal Aliens for Profit.70 Given the resource con-
straints on the interdicting and investigating agencies upon which
the U.S. Attorney relies, prosecutors have focussed on for-profit
trips involving death or bodily injury.71 Convictions under these
statutes carry sentencing guidelines with penalties that increase
substantially depending on whether it is a first or subsequent
offense, proof of financial gain, and whether the defendant caused
death or serious bodily injury. The range in sentencing extends
from misdemeanor charges for transportation of aliens to life in
67. See id.
68. See id. Most Cuban smuggling networks are believed to operate from the
Miami area and most interdictions take place in the Florida Straits south of Miami
and the Florida Keys. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
72. See id.
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prison or death if the defendant caused death."
B. The Prosecutor's Hurdles: Overcoming the Rescue
Defense, Sympathetic South Florida Juries, and
Alien Material Witness Issues.
Suspected smugglers routinely claim that they were on a
legitimate voyage for fishing or pleasure and that they rescued the
migrants when they found them adrift at sea.74 On occasion, pros-
ecutors have successfully overcome the defendant's "rescue"
defense by either proving that the smuggler has family members
on board or through evidentiary admission of information passed
by electronic telex messages from the Cuban Border Guard to the
United States Coast Guard.3 These telexes often indicate a
detailed description of the vessel, identifying hull numbers, an
estimate on the number of people on board, and a last-known posi-
tion of the suspect vessel within Cuban Territorial Seas."6
While the telex information clearly counters the smuggler's
contention of "rescue," it can also be easily excluded as hearsay
since the originator will not be available to testify in a U.S.
Court.7 7 Two possible ways around this obstacle might be availa-
ble. First, the testimony of a law enforcement officer aboard the
Coast Guard Cutter that responded to a Cuban telex and traveled
to the position where they found the described suspect vessel
might suffice. Alternatively, the prosecution could offer the telex
communication as a record of regularly conducted activity under
F.R.E. Rule 803(6), subject to a determination by the court that
information originating from the Cuban authorities, with whom
we have engaged in bilateral migration accords, is trustworthy.
Prosecutors must also contend with issues over whether
South Florida juries may be overly sympathetic to smugglers
given the high level of criticism of the Government of Cuba
expressed by the community at large.78 Consequently, the most
solid and convincing cases are those involving repeat smugglers
and instances where the migrants were exposed to extreme hard-
73. See id. See also Jennifer Babson, Dade Men Linked to Human-Cargo Trade;
Cuban Migrant Died on Bahamas Isle, THE MIAMI HERIALD, Nov. 30, 2001, at 1A.
74. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
75. See id. If a smuggler's family member were on the smuggling vessel, it would
refute any claim that the smugglers just happened to stumble upon migrants in need
of rescue. See id.
76. See Interview with Lt. Joseph Kramek, supra note 21.
77. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
78. See McKinnon, supra note 27, at 36.
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ship, injury, or death.7" Trial venues for suspected smugglers are
generally held in the jurisdiction where the suspects are brought
to shore and turned over to Border Patrol investigators." Most
interdictions occur in the vicinity of Key West, which happens also
to be logistically convenient since Coast Guard resources are
based there. Moreover, this location is strategically important for
prosecutors who want to avoid a presumably sympathetic jury in
Miami."'
Prosecutors are likewise limited by the availability of evi-
dence and witnesses who can testify against the smugglers. 2
Smugglers who anticipate capture will often jettison overboard
the incriminating charts and electronic positioning devices that
indicate the route followed from Cuba to the United States.
83
Migrants rarely are willing to testify against the smugglers. 4 If
any of the migrants are willing to identify and testify against the
smugglers, they must be brought to shore and are then ineligible
for return to Cuba.8 5 Furthermore, a migrant who agrees to impli-
cate the smuggler when interdicted at sea may not be as willing
months later when a case actually goes to trial. A prosecutor is
then left without a material witness and the Cuban migrant is
allowed to remain in the United States. Accordingly, prosecutors
seek migrant material witnesses only in really significant smug-
gling cases."
C. Competing Models: Absolute Prosecution versus the
Unified Task Force Approach
The U.S. Attorney and the law enforcement agencies that
pursue smugglers must collectively determine the best approach
to prosecuting migrant smugglers. One model for enforcement is
to charge every suspect that is apprehended to maximize the num-
ber of convictions, even if the maximum crime punishable is a mis-
demeanor. This approach is attractive for several reasons. An
79. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
80. See id.
81. See id. Prosecutors generally perceive that a jury composed of fewer former
immigrants will be more likely to convict or less sympathetic when sentencing. See
id.
82. See id.
83. Press Release, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida,
Roberto Nieves Alien Smuggling Conviction (Dec. 6, 2000), available at httpl/www.
usdoj.gov/usao/fls/Nieves.html (last visited June 8, 2002).
84. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
85. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 7.
86. See Interview with AUSA Curtis Miner, supra note 4.
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aggressive approach to migrant smugglers could have a substan-
tial deterrent effect against future violations, the increased num-
ber of prosecutions could help legitimize the United States' resolve
to combat smuggling to our international neighbors, and law
enforcement would have a quantifiable measure of its effective-
ness. This approach, however, is in serious tension with the cur-
rent capabilities of the enforcement agencies. Unless the Border
Patrol Anti-Smuggling Units and the Coast Guard are reinforced
with manpower, resources and training to facilitate at sea investi-
gation and detention of smugglers in every case, these agencies
will not be able to give prosecutors the information they will need
to successfully prosecute cases.
In contrast to this absolute model, a preferable approach is
similar to U.S. efforts to combat drug smuggling. A unified task
force with interagency cooperation and comprehensive informa-
tion sharing could help track and connect smugglers and members
of their networks. A prime example of this approach is Operation
Barrier Reef ("Barrier Reef"), initiated in 2001 by the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office for the Southern District of Florida. 7 The objective of
Barrier Reef is to accumulate and record as much information as
possible during all interdictions and then to make the information
available, on demand, to the other contributing law enforcement
officers to develop smuggling conspiracy charges.88 For example, a
smuggling event is disrupted at sea and the suspected smugglers
are identified as U.S. residents; numerous migrants are aboard
the vessel but there is no indication of injury or that lives were put
in serious jeopardy. Maritime interdiction units would have
access to collectively shared information held by INS, Coast
Guard, and state and federal authorities to determine whether the
suspect has a history of smuggling or is a first time offender. In
turn, units could better assess the likelihood the U.S. Attorney
will prosecute or if alternatively, effort should focus on the
exhaustive collection and documentation of personal information,
phone numbers, points of contact, vessel ownership and any other
indicators of the smuggler's network, which could be used in broad
scope investigations or in future prosecutions of more egregious
cases. The end result under this model is fewer criminal charges
filed in day-to-day interdictions, but more comprehensive prosecu-
tions and substantial penalties in future cases. 9
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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The demands that stretch the capacity of law enforcement
resources would still be present, but this model would not impose
further requirements as could be expected in the absolute model.
Barrier Reef already produced its first indictment that exhaus-
tively charged seven suspects with smuggling for profit, conspir-
acy to smuggle illegal aliens into the U.S., and attempted
smuggling resulting in death; these charges carry penalties of up
to life in prison."° The broad scope of the indictment is the result
of comprehensive information sharing and dismantling of the
chief smuggler's network. 1 Four of the seven defendants already
pleaded guilty, including the alleged mastermind.92 Both models
have advantages and disadvantages; however, the unified task
force approach is clearly a better option for results in the current
setting. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen what level of deter-
rence the final outcome of the first Barrier Reef indictment will
have on the frequency of future smuggling events.
V. DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION
What can be done to prevent maritime smuggling before it
happens? The Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Customs, and the
Florida Marine Patrol often locate typical smuggling type fast
boats as they are departing South Florida." These vessels often
have quantities of fuel and food inconsistent with what one would
expect on a short pleasure cruise or fishing trip as well as conflict-
ing explanations about the nature of the voyage; these are often
indicators that are consistent with vessels that travel to Cuba to
smuggle migrants.94 Law enforcement lacks the authority to pro-
hibit the voyages because none of the indicators is a crime in itself
and there is no statutory provision to prohibit operation of a vessel
outfitted to smuggle humans.95 Additionally, U.S. agencies lack
the resources to monitor vessels for the duration of their trip and
can not freely exchange descriptive information of suspicious ves-
sels with Cuba since, presumably, the U.S. government would not
90. Babson, supra note 73 at 1A.
91. See id.
92. Jennifer Babson, 2 Guilty of Smuggling Cubans, THE MILHm HERALD, May 24,
2002, at 3B. The two lead defendants have not yet been sentenced. Id. Two of the
smugglers have already been sentenced to 18 months each for conspiracy to smuggle
and two others will face trial in Key West. Id.
93. See Interview with Lt. Joseph , supra note 21.
94. See id.
95. See id. Vessels outfitted to smuggle contraband are subject to seizure and civil
forfeiture under 19 USCA § 1703. No similar provision, however, exists for human
smuggling. See id.
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want to aid in the apprehension of American residents by the
Cuban government.
In situations where the inspecting officer determines that the
amount of fuel on board the vessel is excessive and constitutes a
safety hazard, vessels can be ordered back to port where voyages
are terminated. 6 At a minimum, this disrupts or delays a
planned smuggling event and obstructs the smuggling network.
Additionally, administrative recording of the occupants' informa-
tion can be shared with other agencies involved with immigration
matters for future use.
VI. WILL NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS SHIFT THE
Focus? RECENT TERROR ATTACKS, LEGISLATION,
AND BORDER SECURITY
In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States in
September 2001, the U.S. government enacted the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT
Act").97 The Act could have significant impact on anti-smuggling
as it thrusts immigration issues into national attention and forces
increased cooperation and information sharing between law
enforcement agencies in the pursuit of excluding terrorists and
dangerous aliens.98 This will probably bring about increased
budgets and resources for the Coast Guard and Border Patrol,
both of which provide border security. 9 On account of the height-
ened level of national security, increases in cooperation and infor-
mation sharing among law enforcement is to be expected and
could have a positive spill-over effect on alien interdiction. Also,
the Act provides for increased powers in investigation of money-
laundering networks 00 that could facilitate disruption of Miami-
based smuggling networks.
Concerns are also mounting that terrorists may align them-
selves with existing alien smuggling organizations in order to gain
96. Coast Guard authority to conduct maritime law enforcement boardings and
safety inspections is derived from 14 U.S.C. 89 (1974).
97. USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law No. 107-56.
98. See Rosemary Jenks, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, A Summary of the Anti-
Terrorism Law's Immigration Related Provisions (Dec. 2001) available at http://www.
cis.org/articles/2001/backlSOl.html (last visited June 8, 2002).
99. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Southern Maine Technical College,
Portland, Maine, (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020125-1.html (last visited June 8, 2002).
100. See Jenks, supra note 98.
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access to the United States. 1' Thus far, immigration response has
focused on accelerated deployments of manpower to the U.S.-
Canada border, while maintaining current manning on the U.S.-
Mexico border. 102 The maritime border of the United States may
be equally susceptible and this threat calls for proportional
increases in manpower and resources. Despite the recent
advancements made toward orderly and legal migration under
The Accords, Cuba continues to be recognized as a state sponsor of
terrorism."3 These two issues are constantly in tension and
demand that the United States exercise continued caution in its
relationship with Cuba.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States should acknowledge that its deferential
policy toward landed Cuban aliens provides incentive for Cubans
to seek passage from smugglers. A policy shift in this area, how-
ever, is unlikely; therefore, the threat of smuggling and smug-
gling-related deaths demands that the United States explore
alternatives to its current anti-smuggling efforts. The United
States must improve law enforcement capability by increasing
funds for improved resources and ensuring border forces are ade-
quately trained and staffed. Prosecutors must maximize prevent-
ative measures under the law through a continued unified task
force approach such as Barrier Reef. Additionally, the scope of
prosecutions should be broadened under existing law to encom-
pass the smuggler's entire support structure. With these changes,
it is possible that the flow of smuggled migrants could be seriously
101. See INS Commissioner James W. Ziglar, Remarks before the House
Committee on Government Reform (Dec. 5, 2001). Regarding long term implications
of Homeland Security needs, Ziglar stated:
".. the National Anti-Smuggling Strategy focuses on the
deterrence, disruption and dismantling of major smuggling
organizations operating not only in the United States, but in source
and transit countries as well. In FY 2002, the strategy will place a
significant emphasis on targeting organizations that smuggle
aliens who present a threat to national security. Terrorists and
their associates are likely to align with specific alien smuggling
networks to obtain entry into the United States. . .The INS' activity
in this area will target specific smuggling corridors, and will
emphasize long term, complex investigations targeting smuggling
organizations that present a threat to national security."
Id.
102. See id.
103. See Martin Arostegui, Fidel May Be Part of Terror Campaign, INSIGHT, Dec.
2001, at 16.
CUBAN MIGRANT SMUGGLING
diminished and countless lives could be saved.t
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